Congress's national-security legislation will often require clear and specific congressional authorization before the executive can undertake certain actions.
INTRODUCTION
Congress's national-security legislation will often require clear and specific congressional authorization before the executive can undertake certain actions. One example is section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which prohibits any statute from authorizing military hostilities unless it "specifically authorizes" such hostilities and "states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution."
1 If Congress fails to enact a statute with this specific language, the War Powers Resolution requires the President to "terminate" hostilities within 60 days. 2 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA") also contains a codified clear-statement requirement, which declares that FISA's procedures are "the exclusive means" for conducting certain forms of electronic surveillance. 3 This exclusivity requirement requires statutes to amend FISA or repeal the "exclusive means" provision before they can authorize electronic surveillance. And this establishes a clearstatement regime because the Supreme Court's precedents disfavor implied repeals, 4 and insist that "the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest." 5 Congress continues to codify additional clear-statement requirements in its recently enacted national-security legislation. The McCain Amendment to the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, for example, provides that its prohibition on certain forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment "shall not be superseded," unless a provision of law "specifically repeals, modifies, or supersedes the provisions of this section." 6 And the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 states that " [o] nly an express statutory authorization for electronic surveillance" may authorize such activities outside of FISA's strictures. 7 These statutes attempt to establish legal answers to the unsettled institutional questions regarding the circumstances in which the President must seek explicit congressional authorization for his actions. They offer an alternative to regimes that allow judges to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to require specific congressional authorization, 8 or that allow the executive to act whenever it can find a surface ambiguity in some statute. 9 These framework statutes are legislatively-enacted "non-delegation canons," 10 designed to strengthen the bicameralism-and-presentment hurdles that the executive must surmount before it can claim legal authority to act.
But efforts to legislate clear-statement regimes in national-security law have failed to induce the political branches to comply with codified clear-statement requirements. During the Kosovo War, the Clinton Administration asserted that Congress had authorized the President to continue the Kosovo War beyond the 60-day limit in the War Powers Resolution. But it inferred this congressional "authorization" from a 1999 appropriations statute that neither mentioned the War Powers Resolution nor specifically authorized the conflict. 11 The statute simply appropriated $5 billion for a fund used to finance overseas military operations, and provided an additional $300 million for military technology needed for the Kosovo campaign. 12 The Clinton Administration's Office of Legal Counsel deployed two tenuous legal arguments to escape the clear-statement regime codified in section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. First, it maintained that section 8(a)(1)'s clear-statement requirement would unconstitutionally "bind a later Congress" if it required statutes specifically to reference the War Powers Resolution as a precondition to authorizing military hostilities. 13 Second, the Clinton Administration insisted that the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act implicitly repealed section 8(a)(1)'s clear-statement requirement, and allowed President Clinton to continue the war without a statute that specifically authorized the hostilities.
14 Litigants challenged the Clinton Administration's argument, but the courts dismissed the case as nonjusticiable. 15 And Congress, rather than enforcing section 8(a)(1)'s clear-statement regime by cutting off funds for the Kosovo War or threatening impeachment, quietly facilitated President Clinton's actions by appropriating funds that he could use to continue the bombing campaign, even as legislators refused to enact the specific authorization that the War Powers Resolution required. 16 A similar pattern of events occurred during the NSA surveillance controversy. The Bush Administration claimed that the post-9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF") authorized the NSA's warrantless surveillance program, even though the statute never mentioned FISA or wiretapping and merely authorized the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against the 9/11 perpetrators. 17 The Bush Administration relied on the same arguments that the Clinton Administration used to establish congressional authorization for the Kosovo War. First, it maintained that FISA's exclusivity requirement would "tie the hands" 18 of future Congresses if it required specific language in statutes that authorize warrantless electronic surveillance. Then it argued that the AUMF implicitly repealed FISA's restrictions. 19 Once again, a court unilateralism when it is politically convenient to do so. 26 And the federal courts' willingness to enforce clear-statement regimes against the President in national-security law bear no relationship to the codified clear-statement requirements in framework legislation or treaties. 27 Congress could produce more effective clear-statement regimes if it precommitted itself against enacting vague or ambiguous legislation from which executive-branch lawyers might claim implicit congressional "authorization" for certain actions. Rather than merely enacting statutes that instruct the executive not to construe ambiguous statutory language as authorizing military hostilities or warrantless electronic surveillance, Congress could establish point-of-order mechanisms that impose roadblocks to enacting such vague legislation in the first place. 28 A point-of-order mechanism would empower a single legislator to object to legislation that authorizes military force, or that funds the military or intelligence agencies, and that fails to explicitly prohibit or withhold funding for military hostilities beyond 60 days or warrantless electronic surveillance, unless the bill includes the specific authorizing language that Congress's framework legislation requires. This device would reduce the likelihood of Congress ever enacting vague or ambiguous legislation that the executive might use to claim "authorization" for extended military hostilities or warrantless electronic surveillance. It would also induce legislators to confront Presidents that act without specific congressional authorization by empowering a single legislator to object to legislation necessary to fund the President's unauthorized endeavors. Yet the political branches have never established such an enforcement mechanism for the clear-statement requirements in national-security legislation, even though they have established such point-of-order devices to enforce precommitments in framework legislation governing the federal budget process. The result is a regime of faint-hearted clear-statement regimes in national-security lawframework legislation that codifies strongly worded clear-statement rules but that lacks any mechanism to induce compliance by future political actors. This may be a calculated choice by of members of Congress, or it may reflect the President's influence in the legislative process, but no one should think that simply legislating more narrow or explicit clear-statement requirements, or adding funding restrictions to Congress's framework legislation, will be able to prevent the executive from continuing to infer congressional authorization from vague or ambiguous statutory language.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the different types of clearstatement requirements that Congress enacts in its national-security framework legislation. Part II shows how executive-branch lawyers used expansive theories of the constitutional-avoidance canon and implied repeal to evade Congress's clear-statement regimes during the Kosovo War and the NSA surveillance controversy, and how Congress failed to force compliance with the codified clear-statement requirements. Part III demonstrates that the court's willingness to enforce clear-statement requirements against the President in national-security law has little relationship to the codified requirements in framework legislation or treaties. Finally, Part IV argues that proposals to strengthen the clear-statement requirements in Congress's national-security framework legislation are unlikely to be effective without institutional mechanisms, such as point of orders, that can deter future legislators from enacting vague or ambiguous legislation from which the executive might claim implicit congressional "authorization," and that can induce Congress to confront Presidents that act without specific congressional authorization. Simply enacting more narrow or explicit clear-statement requirements, or adding funding restrictions to Congress's framework legislation, fails to counter the aggressive interpretive doctrines that Presidents of both political parties have used to concoct congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous statutory language.
I
Almost every statute that Congress enacts creates a clear-statement regime for future legislation. Consider the federal anti-torture statute, which criminalizes torture committed outside the United States. 29 Although it is not phrased as a rule of construction for future legislation, its criminal prohibitions preclude vague or ambiguous statutory language from implicitly authorizing torture because of the strong interpretive presumption against implied repeals.
30 The post-September 11 AUMF, which allows the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against the 9/11 perpetrators, does not suffice to authorize torturous interrogation techniques. Instead, a statute must explicitly amend the pre-existing torture ban or exempt itself from it, or it must produce an implied repeal by specifically authorizing torture. 31 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 has similar effects on later-enacted statutes. Its "exclusive means" provision precludes vague legislation from implicitly authorizing warrantless electronic surveillance; a statute must amend, repeal, or exempt itself from FISA before the executive can implement such a program.
Both these laws restrict the domain of statutory language that future legislators may use to authorize certain activities. And by affecting the interpretation and meaning of future legislation, these statutes partially entrench certain policy outcomes. At the same time, these statutes make congressional decisions to authorize such actions more transparent and visible. They disable legislators from using vague or obscure statutory provisions to "implicitly authorize" certain activities, so long as the executive respects the earlier-enacted statutory provisions and the Supreme Court's well-established presumption against implied repeals. 29 18 U.S.C. § § 2340-2340A. 30 See cases cited in notes 4-5. 31 The Office of Legal Counsel's repudiated "torture opinion" from 2002 never even tried to argue that the AUMF's language authorized torture, or that it implicitly repealed the torture prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. § § 2340-2340A. See, e.g., Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Other statutes pursue these goals more explicitly and to a greater extent. The 2008 FISA Amendments require "express statutory authorization" for any electronic surveillance conducted outside of FISA.
32 Section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution provides that no statute may authorize military hostilities unless it expressly references the War Powers Resolution. 33 And the McCain Amendment to the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act ("DTA") provides that its ban on certain forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment "shall not be superseded" unless a future statute "specifically repeals, modifies, or supersedes the provisions of this section." 34 There are some differences between these statutes and simple statutory prohibitions such as the antitorture statute. Section 8(a)(1) and the DTA are phrased as rules of construction for future statutes, whereas the anti-torture statute and the "exclusive means" provision in the 1978 FISA statute rely on the well-established presumption against implied repeals. And section 8(a)(1) and the DTA establish a more narrow and rule-like boundary around the language that future legislators must use to authorize military hostilities or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. But these differences are matters only of form and degree.
The following table illustrates the different types of national-security statutes that require clear statements in future legislation:
(Figure 1)
All these laws require future legislators to use clear and specific language to authorize certain conduct, but they differ along three dimensions. The first difference involves the scope of future statutory language necessary to authorize certain actions. The "exclusive means" provision in the 1978 FISA statute forecloses most statutes from implicitly authorizing warrantless electronic surveillance, but it might allow other statutes to authorize such surveillance if they specifically exempt themselves from FISA, or include a "notwithstanding any other provision of law" provision, or implicitly repeal FISA's restrictions by contradicting them. The McCain Amendment, by contrast, requires future statutes specifically to mention its provisions in order to authorize cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; implied repeal through contradiction is not effective, nor is a generic "notwithstanding any other provision of law" provision.
The second difference is the type of boundary that surrounds the statutory language necessary to authorize certain conduct. The McCain Amendment's boundary is clear and rule-like; future statutes must specifically reference its provisions in order to authorize "cruel, inhuman, or degrading" treatment. The boundary in the 2008 FISA Amendments, by contrast, is more fuzzy and standard-like: It requires only that statutory authorization for electronic surveillance conducted outside of FISA be "express."
35 What counts as "express" language is a question on which reasonable interpreters might disagree. This second dimension differs from the first; a clear-statement rule might establish a rule-like boundary with a broad scope, or a standard-like boundary with a narrow scope. But the rule-like clear-statement requirements in national-security framework legislation usually allow only a narrow scope of statutory language to authorize certain conduct.
The third and final difference is the law's form. The McCain Amendment to the Detainee Treatment Act and section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution are phrased as rules of construction for future legislation, while the anti-torture statute controls future statutes' meanings by relying on the interpretive presumption against implied repeals. Yet this formal difference does not change these statutes' effects on the interpretation of future statutes: They all constrict the domain of statutory language that future legislators may use to authorize certain executive-branch actions.
Some commentators claim that interpreters cannot allow legislatively-enacted clear-statement requirements to control or affect the meaning of later-enacted statutes. The first line of attack is that codified clear-statement requirements unconstitutionally "bind" future legislators when they limit the scope of statutory language available to authorize certain conduct. Eugene Rostow, for example, asserted that section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution violated the Constitution for this reason. 36 Philip Bobbitt likewise insists that section 8(a)(1) "cannot bind future Congresses" because otherwise the 93rd Congress "would effectively enshrine itself in defiance of the electoral mandate." 37 The Supreme Court has long held that Congress lacks the power to "entrench" statutes by specifying that they are unrepealable, or repealable only by a supermajority vote. 38 But claims that provisions such as section 8(a)(1) "bind" future Congresses are meritless when legislators remain free to repeal the statute through the ordinary bicameralism-and-presentment process, or enact a statute that exempts itself from section 8(a)(1)'s rule of construction. 39 (Such a statute need only state that "section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution shall not be applicable to the provisions of this Act."). Perhaps the War Powers Resolution has some moral or political influence that dissuades lawmakers from repealing or circumventing it, which effectively "binds" future Congresses to section 8(a)(1)'s clear-statement regime. But that type of "binding" effect cannot make a statute unconstitutional; Congress constantly enacts laws that are politically difficult to repeal, 40 and every statute renders some future course of action less politically convenient by changing the default position against which future legislation must be enacted. 41 So long as it remains formally possible for future legislators to change that default position by majority vote, the mere fact that a pre-existing statute makes that course of action politically difficult cannot present constitutional problems.
Section 8(a)(1) does constrain future legislators by limiting the scope of statutory language available to those that wish to authorize military hostilities. But the anti-torture statute, the "exclusive means" provision in the 1978 FISA statute, and the McCain Amendment to the Detainee Treatment Act likewise narrow the range of statutory language that future legislators must use to authorize torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, or warrantless electronic surveillance. Some of these laws allow for a broader range of statutory language than others, but that is a difference only in degree. To claim that section 8(a)(1) violates the Constitution for that reason is to imply that the Constitution forbids any constraints on the language that future legislators must use to authorize executive-branch actions, requiring statutes to be construed in a vacuum without any regard to previously-enacted legislation. That would not be a plausible interpretive theory, much less one that the Constitution requires, as it would forbid interpreters from applying even the ordinary presumption against implied repeals. And the federal courts have uniformly rejected the contention that statutorily-enacted clearstatement rules are unconstitutional attempts to "bind" future Congresses. 42 Others have tried to undermine codified clear-statement requirements by relying on the last-in-time rule and the implied-repeal doctrine. The paradigmatic case is a statute that clearly authorizes certain conduct when read in isolation, but lacks the "magical password" required by an earlier-enacted express-reference requirement, such as section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Suppose, for example, that Congress enacts a statute that specifically authorizes the President "to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," but omits the express reference to the War Powers Resolution. 43 Some have asserted that such a statute would suffice to authorize military hostilities, notwithstanding its failure to reference the War Powers Resolution, and implicitly repeal (in part) section 8(a)(1)'s express-reference requirement. 44 55 In like manner, an interpreter may regard a statute that purports to authorize military hostilities while omitting the express reference to the War Powers Resolution as akin to a "sense of Congress" resolution that expresses aspirational support for something that Congress lacks the wherewithal to give legal force, rather than an attempt to alter or supersede the interpretive default rule in Congress's framework legislation.
The Alexander/Prakash intentionalist approach would establish a wider range of statutes that could "conflict" with and supersede codified clear-statement requirements. But again, no interpreter is legally compelled to adopt their approach, especially when one considers the far-reaching implications of elevating congressional intentions over codified rules of construction. If legislative inattention or unawareness would require interpreters to disregard a statutory express-reference rule such as section 8(a)(1), it would similarly compel them to disregard other laws that affect the meaning of future statutes, including simple statutory prohibitions that control future statutes' meaning through the presumption against implied repeals. Many legislators, for example, were likely unaware of specific provisions in the Geneva Conventions when they authorized President Bush to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against the September 11 perpetrators. Yet the Supreme Court insisted in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 56 that President Bush needed "specific, overriding authorization" to convene military commissions that deviated from procedures required by the Geneva Conventions, even if those procedures might interfere with the President's ability to conduct the War on Terror. Indeed, opening the door to such inquiries would undermine not only the presumption against implied repeals, but any legislative or judicial efforts to achieve rule-based interpretive principles for future legislation. . 57 Alexander and Prakash admit as much, arguing that the judiciary lacks the power to establish rules of thumb for statutory construction, and that the courts' interpretive principles must "mirror the meaning that one would otherwise derive from a statute." See Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, None of these objections is fatal to Congress's efforts to legislate clear-statement regimes in national-security law. They establish only that fundamental disagreements exist over interpretive theory, and that some interpreters may choose to take a broad view of "conflict" or "repugnancy" between a codified clear-statement requirement and a laterenacted statute. But there is no legal obligation for interpreters to adopt a theory of implied repeal that undermines or disregards Congress's codified clear-statement requirements. And so long as adherence to Congress's codified clear-statement requirements is a permissible interpretive approach, the success of Congress's efforts to establish clear-statement regimes will depend on whether institutional mechanisms can ensure that future political actors will comply with the clear-statement requirements in Congress's framework legislation. (2004) ("In our view, the federal judiciary has no authority to create binding rules of interpretation that it will use to construe federal statutes."); id. at 104 ("We do not believe that the judiciary may constitutionally enforce a judicially crafted rule against implied repeals."). 58 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty 32-33 (noting that first-best arguments over interpretive theory end in stalemate, and should be resolved by institutional considerations). 59 See Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 2000 WL 33716980 (O.L.C.) at *13. Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution requires the President to submit a report to Congress whenever, "[i]n the absence of a declaration of war," United States Armed Forces are introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," or "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, War Powers Resolution, which required the President to "terminate" the hostilities within sixty days, unless Congress: (1) declares war or enacts "specific authorization" to use the Armed Forces; (2) enacts a law that extends the 60-day window; or (3) is "physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States." 60 And under section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, no statute may authorize military hostilities unless it "specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities" and "state[s] that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution." 61 But Congress never provided "specific authorization" for these airstrikes. Although the Senate passed a resolution authorizing the President to conduct "military air operations" against Serbia, 62 the House of Representatives defeated that resolution on a 213-213 tie vote. 63 Instead, Congress enacted a $13 billion Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which provided aid to U.S. farmers, funding for military construction projects, and appropriations related to the Kosovo hostilities. Specifically, the statute provided $5 billion for the "Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund" 64 and $300 million for military technology "needed for the conduct of Operation Allied Force." It also required the President to submit a report to Congress describing "any significant revisions to the total cost estimate" for Operation Allied Force "through the end of fiscal year 1999."
65 President Clinton signed the Appropriations Act on May 21, 1999, shortly before the 60-day clock expired on May 25. But he did not "terminate" the Kosovo War within that 60-day window; he continued bombing until June 11, 1999.
The 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act lacks any statement that specifically authorized the conflict, and it never references the War Powers Resolution. But the Office of Legal Counsel insisted that this legislation authorized President Clinton to extend the Kosovo War beyond 60 days. 66 This conclusion is impossible to reconcile with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which states that authorization for military hostilities "shall not be inferred from any provision of law . . . including any provision contained in any appropriations Act," unless the provision "specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities" and "sta [tes] that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this 68 even though Congress remains free to repeal section 8(a)(1) through the ordinary bicameralism-and-presentment process.
69 OLC cited several Supreme Court decisions to buttress its constitutional attack on section 8(a)(1), but none of them is on point. 70 Most of those opinions state only that Congress may not enact unrepealable statutes;
71 they have nothing to say about statutes that establish revocable rules of construction for future legislation. 72 And the OLC memo simply ignores the numerous federal-court decisions that had rejected arguments that statutorily-enacted clearstatement rules were unconstitutional attempts to "bind" future Congresses.
73 OLC also 67 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (emphasis added). 68 Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 2000 WL 33716980 (O.L.C.) at *9. See also id. at *10 ("If section 8(a)(1) were read to block all possibility of inferring congressional approval of military action from any appropriation, unless that appropriation referred in terms to the WPR and stated that it was intended to constitute specific authority for the action under that statute, then it would be unconstitutional."). 69 1955) , as holding that statutes may not require "magical passwords" in future legislation. But Marcello holds only that section 559 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that a subsequent statute could not supercede or modify the APA "except to the extent that it does so expressly," 5 U.S.C. § 559, does not require a "magical password" as written. See 349 U.S. at 310 ("Unless we are to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Adminstrative Procedure Act, we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the hearing provisions of that Act."). Section 559 is a less demanding rule of construction than section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, requiring only "express" language rather than a specific reference to a previously enacted statute. Nowhere does Marcello hold or intimate that Congress is constitutionally disabled from enacting statutes such as section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which actually require "magical passwords" in future legislation. Indeed, the Marcello Court respected Congress's prerogative to enact rules of construction for future statutes and fully enforced section 559 of the APA according to its terms. See id. at 310 (noting that "[e]xemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement in § 12 of the Act that modifications must be express."). 73 See cases cited in note 42. 76 nor do they explain how section 8(a)(1) "binds" or "controls" future Congresses when Congress remains free to repeal it or exempt future statutes from its requirements. 77 From that groundwork, the OLC opinion invokes the constitutional-avoidance canon, and converts section 8(a)(1) into a "background principle" that applies only if a statute is "entirely ambiguous" as to whether it authorizes military hostilities. 78 Rather than declaring section 8(a)(1) unconstitutional, OLC chose to "interpret" section 8(a)(1) to avoid the supposed "constitutional problem" presented by one Congress binding its successors. This is a far-reaching application of the constitutional-avoidance canon. 77 Against these sources stood other commentators, such as John Hart Ely, who saw no constitutional problems with section 8(a)(1), and insisted that it should be enforced as a "bright-line test" unless repealed by a subsequent Congress. See John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility at 129 ("If subsequent Congresses don't like [section 8(a)(1)], they can repeal the Resolution. Until they do, the conventions it establishes should control.") (Emphasis added). Professor Ely allowed that Congress might implicitly repeal section 8(a)(1) in "extreme circumstances," if it "for some bizarre reason . . . were to make unmistakable its intention both to authorize a war and to do so in a way that did not comply with section 8(a)(1)." Id. at 129 & n. 57. But he was clear that only a repeal could justify a departure from section 8(a)(1)'s bright-line rule, and only statutes with an "unmistakable intention" to authorize war would repeal it. To avoid the appearance of cherry-picking agreeable commentators, the OLC opinion cites Professor Ely's book and states that he "notes that unless the Resolution is repealed, a subsequent Congress can only authorize hostilities through an appropriation statute under 'extreme circumstances. ' Supreme Court has held that the constitutional-avoidance canon can apply only when a statute allows for more than one interpretation. 79 Not only is section 8(a)(1)'s expressreference requirement unambiguous, it applies specifically to "any provision contained in any appropriations Act." 80 And the only relevant sources that OLC cites to establish a "constitutional problem" with section 8(a)(1)'s express-reference requirement are opinions from commentators that were unsupported by legal authorities. If that can allow an interpreter to use the constitutional-avoidance canon to alter the meaning of specific and unambiguous statutory language, then the executive can escape almost any statutory constraint; most Acts of Congress encounter at least one commentator with constitutional objections. 81 The Bush Administration would later emulate this tactic of interpreting pellucid statutory language to avoid an asserted "constitutional problem" that judicial precedents have never recognized. 82 More importantly, the Clinton Administration never explains the distinction between statutes that unconstitutionally "bind" future Congresses and those that do not. Its argument seems driven by an intuition that section 8(a)(1) unduly burdens a future Congress's ability to authorize military hostilities. 83 Yet every law establishes default positions and burdens of inertia that advocates of some future policy must overcome by enacting certain statutory language. 84 The ban on torture, for example, requires protorture legislators to enact statutory language specific enough to produce an express or implied repeal of 18 U.S.C. § § 2340-2340A. Nowhere did OLC's Kosovo memo argue that the presumption against implied repeals is unconstitutional, nor did it assert that the Constitution requires interpreters to ignore previously-enacted statutes in the U.S. Code. 185, 204 (1986) (arguing that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget legislation was an unconstitutional attempt to "constrain future Congresses," even though it remained possible for Congress to repeal it, because it "alters the qualitative character of the legislative action required to enact or preserve future spending policies"). 84 See "might" inform a later statute's meaning when its text and legislative history are "entirely ambiguous."
85 But OLC never attempts to define or limit the circumstances in which an interpreter may disregard a codified clear-statement requirement on constitutional grounds. This gives the executive branch considerable latitude to interpret away Congress's other codified clear-statement requirements, including statutory prohibitions such as the 1978 FISA statute, by asserting that they "bind" successor Congresses.
OLC's second legal argument was that the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act effects an "implied partial repeal" of section 8(a)(1)
87 it never earmarks this money for military operations in Kosovo. The statute also appropriates $300 million for military technology "needed for the conduct of Operation Allied Force," but this provision has no bearing on the duration of lawful hostilities or on whether President Clinton could continue the war beyond May 25, 1999. Finally, the statute requires the President to submit a report that provides "any significant revisions to the total cost estimate" for Operation Allied Force "through the end of fiscal year 1999. Goss) . Majority Whip Tom DeLay also made clear that his vote for the appropriations statute would not endorse President Clinton's war policy: "I have not been shy in stating my own opposition to manner in which the President has handled this situation, but this bill is about supporting our troops and making sure they have the tools and the training that they need to return home safely." 145 Cong. Rec. H2815-07 at H2820. See also id. at H2821 ("[W]hile I object to the President's handling of this situation, I know our troops need our support now more than ever. The Congress cannot abandon our troops just because the President deploys them unwisely. . . . We must support our troops even as we disagree with the President. . . . We have an obligation to give our sons and daughters everything they need to protect themselves."). 92 . 94 See Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., (Mar. 7, 1973) p. 8 (statement of Hon. Jacob K. Javits) (noting that war funding measures are "rarely unequivocally before us in a clear-cut way. Funds for troops in the field are often mixed up with other funds for deployment of forces around the world, et cetera. As you know, the budget for Vietnam was never per se the budget for Vietnam. It was always combined with hardware and munitions, and the pay of the troops, and so on."); Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power 125 ("I could not accept the idea that broad appropriations acts authorizing money for a large number of vital governmental functions could be read as specific authorizations for hostilities."). See also Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 31, n.10 (2000) (Randolph, J., concurring) ("As 'every schoolboy knows,' Congress may pass such [appropriations] Clinton to continue the war beyond 60 days, but that is a far cry from a clear congressional intent to partially repeal the War Powers Resolution.
Finally, OLC's belief that the Appropriations Act implicitly repealed substantive legislation contradicts settled understandings regarding the scope of appropriations laws. The Supreme Court enforces a strong presumption against interpreting appropriations to amend previously enacted statutes, noting that a contrary regime would stymie the budget process with fears that appropriations might implicitly repeal prior statutory prohibitions. 95 And Rule XXI, clause 2 of the Rules of the House of Representatives prohibits general appropriations bills from including provisions that "chang[e] existing law." 96 Although the House waived points of order against violations of this rule when it debated the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 97 the rule reflects a strong institutional understanding that appropriations do not implicitly amend substantive legislation. Yet OLC declared that a mere appropriations law partially repealed the War Powers Resolution, even though its language never authorized President Clinton to continue the Kosovo War beyond the War Powers Resolution's 60-day window, and many of its congressional supporters insisted that it would not authorize the President's military endeavors.
B
Six-and-a-half years after the Kosovo War, the Bush Administration used similar legal arguments to claim that Congress had authorized warrantless electronic surveillance in the post-September 11th Authorization to Use Military Force ("AUMF"). Like the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration needed to surmount a codified clearstatement requirement. The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act imposes criminal liability on anyone who "engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute."
98 And a separate statutory provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f), insists that Congress's codified procedures "shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . may be conducted."
99 By prohibiting other statutes from authorizing such surveillance outside the procedures specified in FISA and chapter legislation, not because it is in favor of continuing the hostilities, but because it does not want to endanger soldiers in the field."). 95 See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) ("When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. Without such an assurance, every appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering substantive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute which might prohibit the expenditure."). OLC attempted to distinguish TVA v. Hill, see Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 2000 WL 33716980 (O.L.C.) at *23, but the Supreme Court's presumption against implied repeals applies to all legislation, see cases cited in notes 4-5, and the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act comes nowhere close to overcoming it. 96 See Rules of the House of Representatives, 106th Congress, Rule XXI, clause 2, part 2(b) ( § 1038) ("A provision changing existing law may not be reported in a general appropriation bill. . . "); id. at 2(c) ( § 1039) ("An amendment to a general appropriation bill shall not be in order if changing existing law. . .") 97 See 145 Cong. Rec. H2815-H2816, H2823. 98 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a). 99 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (emphasis added).
119 of Title 18, the "exclusive means" provision requires future statutes to amend FISA's restrictions or exempt themselves from them, or so clearly authorize electronic surveillance as to effect an implied repeal of FISA's exclusivity requirement. Like section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, it precludes Congress from implicitly authorizing warrantless electronic surveillance through ambiguity or acquiescence to the executive branch.
100
Yet the Department of Justice claimed that the post-9/11 Authorization to Use Military Force ("AUMF") authorized warrantless electronic surveillance, even though the AUMF does not mention FISA or electronic surveillance. The AUMF simply provides (in relevant part) that the President may "use all necessary and appropriate force" against nations, organizations, or persons that he determines were connected to the September 11th attacks. 101 A DOJ White Paper insists that specific statutory language was unnecessary to authorize the NSA surveillance program, and escapes FISA's exclusivity requirement by deploying the same arguments that the Clinton Administration used to avoid the War Powers Resolution's clear-statement rule. First, the DOJ White Paper claims that "[t]here would be a serious question as to whether the Ninety-Fifth Congress could have so tied the hands of its successors" by precluding future statutes from implicitly authorizing warrantless electronic surveillance. 102 The obvious riposte is that Congress remains free to repeal FISA's exclusivity requirement at any time, or exempt future statutes from its requirements; no legislature's "hands" are "tied" by this interpretive default rule. But this was equally true of the clear-statement requirement in section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which the Clinton Administration's OLC similarly refused to enforce on the ground that it "binds" future Congresses. 103 The DOJ White Paper takes the Clinton Administration's argument to its logical conclusion, and asserts that even the ordinary presumption against implied repeals "tie[s] the hands" of Congress to the extent that it allows a past statute to affect a future statute's meaning.
Invoking the constitutional-avoidance canon, the DOJ White Paper asserts that FISA's exclusivity requirement is insufficiently "clear" to affect the meaning of the laterenacted AUMF. 104 But it never identifies the ambiguous language in FISA. 105 104 See id. at 22 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) as "[f]ar from a clear statement of congressional intent"); id. ("In the absence of a clear statement to the contrary, it cannot be presumed that Congress attempted to abnegate its own authority in such a way."); id. at 26 ("Nor could the Ninety-Fifth Congress tie the hands of a subsequent Congress in this way, at least in the absence of far clearer statutory language expressly requiring that result.") (emphasis added). 105 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f). In a footnote, DOJ suggested that 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a), which criminalizes "electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute," could be "read to designates its procedures as the "exclusive means" by which electronic surveillance shall be conducted; that leaves no room for the AUMF to authorize warrantless surveillance without language clear enough to amend or repeal FISA. Without evincing any sense of irony, the DOJ White Paper contrasts FISA's exclusivity provision with section 8(a)(1) the War Powers Resolution, describing section 8(a)(1) as "far clearer statutory language," and implying that section 8(a)(1) is sufficiently clear to control the meaning of future statutes. 106 The DOJ White Paper never mentions the Clinton-era OLC Kosovo memo, which converted this "far clearer statutory language" into a mere "background principle" that no longer controls the meaning of future legislation.
Finally, the DOJ White Paper claims that the AUMF affects an implied partial repeal of FISA's exclusivity requirement. 107 Once again, this follows the reasoning in the OLC Kosovo memo, which argues that the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act implicitly repealed section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. But here, as in the Kosovo situation, there is no conflict or repugnancy between the earlier and later-enacted statutes. The DOJ White Paper claims that "[t]he President's determination" that the NSA surveillance program was necessary and appropriate created a "clear conflict" between the AUMF and FISA.
108 But the AUMF authorizes only "necessary and appropriate force"; it does not extend to whatever force the President believes to be necessary and appropriate. "Necessary and appropriate" force is ambiguous, and it is hard to see how warrantless electronic surveillance qualifies as "appropriate" force when pre-existing statutes criminalize it. The DOJ White Paper essentially argues that ambiguous statutory language may implicitly repeal an earlier statute if the President chooses to interpret the later-enacted statute that way. That approach to the last-in-time rule is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's precedents, which insist that "the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest."
109
It is also noteworthy that the AUMF's drafters were careful to satisfy section 8(a)(1)'s clear-statement requirement in authorizing the President to use military force. 110 The comparative lack of reference to FISA or electronic surveillance implies that the political branches were unable or unwilling to overcome the burden of inertia created by FISA's "exclusive means" provision, or to establish a repugnancy sufficient to implicitly repeal FISA's provisions. 111 constitute a procedure or incorporate procedures not expressly enumerated in FISA." See DOJ White Paper at 23 n. 8. But 50 U.S.C. § 1809 is not a "procedure" in FISA; it is a substantive criminal prohibition that allows an exception for electronic surveillance authorized by statute. 106 See DOJ White Paper at 26. 107 Id. at 36 n. 21. 108 Id. 
III
Congress or the federal judiciary might have taken steps to enforce these codified clear-statement requirements against the executive branch's aggressive interpretive theories. Legislators, for example, could have withheld appropriations from the unauthorized activities, refused to confirm the President's nominees in retaliation for his unilateral endeavors, or even commenced impeachment proceedings if legislators deemed the President's "constitutional avoidance" and "implied repeal" arguments to be abusive or lawless.
112 Congress, however, did none of those things in responding to the Kosovo War or the NSA warrantless surveillance controversy, and Presidents Clinton and Bush were able to continue these endeavors for a time without specific congressional authorization. 114 But the district court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III "standing" and refused to rule on the merits of the dispute.
115
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit similarly held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they retained "ample legislative power" to stop the war by withholding funds.
116
And Congress, left to fend for its own institutional prerogatives, never used its constitutional powers to induce the President to comply with section 8(a)(1)'s clearstatement regime. To the contrary, Congress facilitated President Clinton's decision to continue the war by enacting the Appropriations Act without attempting to force the Administration to comply with the War Powers Resolution's clear-statement framework.
Litigants also asked the federal judiciary to enforce FISA's clear-statement regime, but to no avail. Although a federal district court enjoined the NSA program, the detention. Id. at 517-519. But the Non-Detention Act lacks any provision akin to FISA's "exclusive means" requirement, so it does not codify any roadblock to future statutes that implicitly authorize citizen detention. 112 court of appeals promptly stayed that ruling and eventually dismissed the case on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. 117 Even though the plaintiffs regularly communicated with persons that they might be targeted for surveillance, the Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked "injury in fact" because they could not show that they actually were subject to surveillance, either in the past or the future. 118 Instead, the plaintiffs asserted only the possibility that they might be monitored, and the court deemed that too "speculative" to create an Article III case or controversy.
119
After the court of appeals' rulings in the Kosovo and NSA surveillance litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari and refused to reconsider the judge-created standing doctrines that had insulated the executive branch's legal arguments from judicial review. 120 118 Id. at 656 (opinion of Batchelder, J.) (" [B] ecause the plaintiffs cannot show that they have been or will be subjected to surveillance personally, they clearly cannot establish standing under the Fourth Amendment or FISA."); id. at 656 (opinion of Batchelder, J.) (describing plaintiff's anticipated harm as "neither imminent nor concrete -it is hypothetical, conjectural, or speculative"); id. at 688 (Gibbons, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The disposition of all of the plaintiffs' claims depends upon the single fact that the plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence that they are personally subject to the TSP. Without this evidence, on a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs cannot establish standing for any of their claims, constitutional or statutory."). 119 Id. at 656-57 (opinion of Batchelder, J.); id. at 690 (Gibbons, J., concurring). 120 Numerous commentators have challenged the notion that Article III requires plaintiffs to show "injury in fact," and have criticized the "injury in fact" requirement as manipulable and incoherent. Second, the administration argued that the AUMF authorized the President to exercise his traditional war powers, including the trial and punishment of enemy combatants. 125 Finally, it relied on Article 21 of the UCMJ, which stated that provisions conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial "do not deprive military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be tried by military commission."
But the Court held that these statutes were insufficient to authorize military commissions that lacked the procedures prescribed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 36 of the UCMJ. Instead, the President needed "specific, overriding authorization" 126 to overcome the limitations in those pre-existing laws due to the presumption against implied repeals. The Court enforced these latter provisions as clear-statement rules that precluded the President from acting pursuant to less specific statutory language.
127
Yet it was far from evident that Common Article 3's limitations even applied to the United States' armed conflict with al Qaeda, so as to require specific congressional authorization for the President's proposed military commissions. Common Article 3 applies only to "conflict[s] not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties," 128 and President Bush interpreted this language to apply only to civil wars completely internal to one signatory state. The text does not compel this interpretation, 129 but the President's view was at least a permissible construction of the treaty language, and prior Court decisions had afforded "great weight" to executive-branch treaty interpretations. 130 129 For example, the phrase "international character" is ambiguous as to whether it requires a conflict between sovereign nations or includes any conflict in the territory of more than one nation. And "one of the High Contracting Parties" need not be construed to mean "only one of High Contracting Parties." courts owe substantial deference to executive-branch treaty interpretations. 132 Yet the Hamdan Court did not even mention its precedents that required deference to the executive as it held that Common Article 3 applied to all conflicts not between sovereign nations, including the United States' armed conflict with al Qaeda. 133 The Hamdan Court also made opportunistic use of the Geneva Conventions' negotiating record. In the draft Convention proposed at Stockholm, Common Article 3's protections applied to "all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international character, especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which may occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties." 134 The final version, by contrast, extended Common Article 3 to "all cases of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." 135 The Hamdan Court thought it significant that the final document omitted the phrase "especially [to] cases of civil war," and insisted that Common Article 3 must therefore apply beyond civil wars. 136 The Court also asserted that the final version of Common Article 3 carried a "broader scope of application" than "earlier proposed iterations." 137 But the Court never so much as mentioned that the delegates contracted Common Article 3's scope from "the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties" (in the Stockholm text) to "the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" (in the final version). This change supports the President's view that Common Article 3 applies only to armed conflicts wholly internal to one signatory state, and the Court conveniently chose to ignore it.
President from acting without specific congressional authorization? One possible explanation may be that judges are reluctant to enjoin a war or a terrorist surveillance program because they are uncertain of the national-security harms that their decision would cause. Nonjusticiability doctrines and denials of certiorari enable to the courts to avoid responsibility for that outcome, even if they believe that the President is acting lawlessly by failing to obtain specific congressional authorization. Perhaps the Justices were less concerned about the consequences of enjoining the Guantanamo military commissions, which involved only the punishment of captured terrorists who no longer posed a national-security threat. 139 On this view, the Supreme Court's unexplained departure from its precedents that required deference to a President's treaty interpretations, and its highly selective use of Geneva's negotiating record, might be an attempt to compensate for its non-intervention during the Kosovo and NSA surveillance controversies. By failing to enforce Congress's clear-statement requirements in the War Powers Resolution and FISA, the courts had skewed the President's incentives to act unilaterally even when an existing statute required specific congressional authorization. Hamdan's broad construction of Common Article 3 counters this by requiring Presidents to consider the risk that courts might broadly construe codified clear-statement requirements in the event that they decide to reach the merits of a dispute. This gives future Presidents an incentive to seek specific congressional authorization whenever language in an existing statute or treaty might be read to require such a clear statement from Congress, even if the President reasonably believes that the statute or treaty is inapplicable. In this sense, the tension between Hamdan and court precedents requiring deference to the executive produce a regime of legal uncertainty that could dissuade the executive branch from pressing its expansive constitutional avoidance and implied repeal theories in other contexts whenever judicial review of the merits is at possible, even if the courts ultimately decide to avoid ruling on the merits.
140
But the federal courts' performances in Hamdan, and in the Kosovo and NSA surveillance litigation, show that judicial enforcement of clear-statement requirements has little to do with the commands in Congress's framework legislation or treaties. Instead, judicial enforcement of codified clear-statement requirements is sporadic and unpredictable; some of them are underenforced, while others are overenforced. The outcomes in court bear no relationship to a legislature's decision to establish narrow, rule-like, or explicit clear-statement requirements in national-security framework legislation.
IV
139 See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance 272 (2006) (characterizing Hamdan as a "reassertion of judicial muscle after an emergency has run its course"). 140 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 07-07 (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=998601) (suggesting that one possible benefit of legal uncertainty is that it might keep actors or institutions from pressing the limits of their authority); Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration 33 (noting the danger that the executive branch might interpret the law "opportunistically to serve its own ends" when it acts outside the reach of courts).
All of these recent controversies illustrate the difficulties that confront efforts to legislate effective clear-statement regimes in national-security law. First, interpretive doctrines such as the constitutional-avoidance canon and the last-in-time rule enabled executive-branch lawyers to concoct congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous statutory provisions, even in the teeth of framework legislation that required specific congressional authorization for the President's actions. The executive-branch legal arguments were strained, yet they provided some political cover for the President's actions and, in the NSA surveillance episode, might have protected lower-level executive employees from the fear of criminal liability. Second, Congress failed to compel the President to seek the specific congressional authorization that the framework legislation required. There are many possible reasons for Congress's failure to force Presidents Clinton and Bush to comply with the clear-statement regimes. The harms that the executive branch caused to Congress's institutional prerogatives and the rule of law may have been too abstract to trigger a stronger backlash, and were unlikely to hinder any legislator's re-election bid because there was sufficient political support for the President's actions. 141 Or perhaps partisan loyalties contributed to the Republican-led 109th Congress's acquiescence to President Bush's actions during the NSA surveillance controversy, or Democratic legislators' unwillingness to withhold funds for the Kosovo War.
142 Finally, judicial enforcement of codified clear-statement requirements in national-security law is arbitrary and sporadic. In Hamdan, the Supreme Court enforced a clear-statement requirement by adopting a broad construction of vague language the Geneva Conventions, yet in the Kosovo and NSA surveillance controversies, the courts were content to allow Congress's explicit clear-statement requirements in the War Powers Resolution and FISA to go unenforced.
All of this has spurred proposals to strengthen the clear-statement regimes in Congress's national-security legislation. Some have proposed to amend the War Powers Resolution and FISA by tightening the clear-statement requirements and adding provisions that withhold funding from activities that Congress has not specifically authorized. And Congress continues to enact new clear-statement requirements in its national-security legislation; it recently imposed more narrow and explicit clearstatement rules regarding electronic surveillance outside of FISA and detainee treatment.
143 But these statutes and proposals are unlikely to prevent executive-branch lawyers from continuing to apply their broad theories of constitutional avoidance and implied repeal to infer congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous statutes. Nor are they likely to enhance the ability of legislators or courts to resist executivebranch endeavors that lack the specific authorization that the framework statutes require. A more effective clear-statement regime in national-security law will require point-oforder mechanisms that precommit future legislators against enacting ambiguous statutory language that executive-branch lawyers might use to claim congressional authorization, and that enable future legislators to resist the executive when it acts without specific congressional authorization. Congress's insistence on legislating more narrow and explicit clear-statement requirements in its national-security legislation, without any point-of-order devices or other precommitment mechanisms, will do little to establish an effective clear-statement regime in national-security law.
A
Numerous proposals to strengthen the clear-statement regimes in Congress's national-security legislation have focused on imposing more narrow clear-statement requirements or adding funding restrictions to the framework legislation. Consider, for example, Senator Specter's proposal in the 109th Congress to reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The Specter bill reiterates that FISA (along with chapters 119, 121, and 206 of title 18, United States Code) shall be "the exclusive means" by which electronic surveillance may be conducted in the United States, but adds the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law." 144 The Specter proposal further states that no provision of law may repeal or modify FISA unless it "expressly amends or otherwise specifically cites this title."
145 Congress failed to enact Senator Specter's proposal, but it did enact a provision in the 2008 FISA Amendments that specifies that "only an express statutory authorization for electronic surveillance" may authorize electronic surveillance outside of FISA's procedures. 146 This new statute attempts to foreclose the Bush Administration's argument that FISA's "exclusive means" provision was insufficiently "clear" to affect the meaning of the later-enacted AUMF. There have also been numerous proposals to add funding restrictions to Congress's national-security legislation. Senator Specter's proposed FISA amendments, for example, provide that "no funds appropriated or otherwise made available by any Act" may be expended for electronic surveillance conducted outside of FISA and chapters 119, 121, and 206 of title 18, U.S. Code. 149 Professor John Hart Ely proposed a similar amendment to the War Powers Resolution that withholds funding from military ventures that Congress has not specifically authorized. 150 Other commentators have endorsed similar proposals. 151 But none of these proposed reforms is likely to prevent the executive branch from continuing to infer congressional "authorization" from ambiguous later-enacted statutes, nor are they likely to prevent future Congresses from acquiescing to this practice.
The first problem is that these new statutes and proposals fail to counter the aggressive interpretive doctrines that executive-branch lawyers use to infer congressional authorization from legislation that lacks the required clear statement. The Clinton Administration's Kosovo memo already provides a roadmap for the executive branch to evade the clear-statement rule in the 2008 FISA Amendments, which insists that "only an express statutory authorization for electronic surveillance" may authorize electronic surveillance outside of FISA's procedures. 152 The OLC Kosovo memo characterizes the express-reference requirement in section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution as an invalid attempt to "bind" future Congresses, and converts it into a standard-like "background principle" that applies only when future legislation is "entirely ambiguous" as to whether it authorizes military hostilities. 153 There is little reason to think that future executives will treat FISA's new express-language requirement any differently if they anticipate that Congress is likely to acquiesce. Executive-branch lawyers can also invoke the Clinton and Bush Administration's broad theories of implied repeal if they find language in a later-enacted statute that might be read to authorize warrantless surveillance. The more narrow clear-statement requirements in Senator Specter's proposed FISA reforms and the recently-enacted McCain Amendment would fare no better. Even though they purport to entrench themselves against implied repeal, 154 the executive can assert, as it did during the Kosovo and NSA surveillance controversies, that this partial entrenchment "binds" future Congresses and proceed with its broad theories of implied repeal.
The proposals to add funding restrictions to FISA and the War Powers Resolution are equally vulnerable to expansive executive-branch theories of implied repeal. Recall that the OLC Kosovo memo asserts that the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act implicitly repealed restrictions in the War Powers Resolution, even though the Appropriations Act never earmarked funds for military operations in Kosovo, nor specifically authorized military operations in Kosovo beyond the WPR's 60-day window. By OLC's lights, it was enough that some members of Congress thought that the President might continue the Kosovo hostilities beyond 60 days and that the appropriations legislation did not expressly withhold funds for that purpose. 155 In like manner, a future executive might claim that a generic Authorization to Use Military Force implicitly repeals Senator Specter's proposed funding restrictions under the last-intime rule, so long as it can concoct some argument that legislators are aware (or should be aware) that warrantless surveillance of the enemy is a "fundamental incident of the use of military force."
156 Or the executive might claim that annual appropriations bills for the intelligence agencies implicitly repeal the earlier-enacted funding restrictions if legislators are aware of the President's warrantless surveillance activities but fail to expressly reaffirm FISA's restrictions. Proposals that would add funding restrictions to the War Powers Resolution are similarly incapable of withstanding the executive-branch lawyers' broad theories of implied repeal. Those funding restrictions, like section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, would be brushed aside whenever implicit congressional "authorization" might be found in vague or ambiguous statutory language.
The challenge for these efforts to strengthen the War Powers Resolution and FISA is that any future ambiguous statute will provide rope for executive-branch lawyers to concoct congressional "authorization" for the President's actions, no matter what restrictions or interpretive instructions Congress provides in framework legislation. None of these proposed reforms will disable the executive from using its expansive theories of constitutional avoidance and implied repeal to provide a veneer of legality for the President's actions, and to minimize the prospect of future criminal sanctions and political reprisals against executive-branch employees.
B
Congress could establish more effective clear-statement regimes in nationalsecurity law if it precommitted itself against enacting vague or ambiguous statutory language that the executive might use to claim implicit congressional "authorization." One such precommitment strategy would be to include point-of-order mechanisms in the War Powers Resolution and FISA (and other national-security framework statutes). 155 See notes 86-97 and accompanying text. 156 Cf. DOJ White Paper at 10 (arguing that "[t]he broad language of the AUMF affords the President, at a minimum, discretion to employ the traditional incidents of the use of military force" and that "the NSA surveillance described by the President is a fundamental incident of the use of military force").
These would empower any individual legislator to object to any bill that authorizes military force, or that funds the military or the intelligence agencies, and that fails to explicitly prohibit military hostilities beyond 60 days or warrantless electronic surveillance, unless Congress has specifically authorized such activities. Congress could further specify that if the point of order is sustained, the bill will be automatically amended to specifically prohibit or withhold funding for such activities.
When a legislator raises a point of order, the chair must either sustain it and and declare the legislation out of order, or overrule it. 157 Then a majority vote of the chamber can reverse the chair's ruling. Establishing point-of-order mechanisms in the War Powers Resolution and FISA would strengthen the codified clear-statement requirements in two ways. First, they would impose a procedural roadblock to ambiguous statutory language that executive-branch lawyers might construe as implicitly authorizing extended military hostilities or warrantless electronic surveillance. Second, they would help deter future legislators from acquiescing to Presidential actions that Congress has not specifically authorized. Yet Congress has never established a point-of-order mechanism to enforce the clear-statement requirements in its national-security legislation, 158 even though it regularly employs this device to enforce precommitments in legislation that governs the federal budget process.
If Congress had included such a point-of-order mechanism in the War Powers Resolution, any legislator could have objected to the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act when it reached the House or Senate floor. Any such objection would require the chair to sustain the point of order and amend the legislation, because the bill appropriated money for the military yet failed to withhold funds for military hostilities that extend beyond 60 days. Then a majority vote of the entire chamber would have been necessary to overturn the chair's ruling and allow the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to survive as written. And if the chair had decided to overrule the point-of-order objection in violation of the chamber's rule, the objecting legislator could have appealed the chair's ruling to the full chamber, where a majority vote could overrule the chair's ruling and sustain the point of order. If FISA had included a point-of-order enforcement mechanism, any legislator could have raised a similar objection to the post-September 11th Authorization to Use Military Force, and the 157 Glennon, eds. 1980) . But Congress never enacted these proposals. Section 5(C) of the proposed Baker-Christopher "War Powers Consultation Act of 2009" hints at establishing point-of-order mechanisms to induce the President to seek congressional authorization for significant armed conflicts, but it also proposes to repeal the clear-statement requirement in section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. CITE?
annual appropriations legislation to fund the intelligence agencies, unless those statutes were amended to specifically preclude electronic surveillance outside of FISA.
Point-of-order mechanisms would not completely foreclose Congress from enacting ambiguous legislation such as the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act or the post-9/11 Authorization to Use Military Force. But they would impose significant procedural obstacles to legislation that executive-branch lawyers might use to claim implicit congressional authorization for extended military hostilities or electronic surveillance. Unless Congress specifically authorizes military hostilities beyond 60 days or warrantless electronic surveillance, appropriations statutes that fail to explicitly prohibit or withhold funding for such activities will survive only if: (1) Every single legislator in a chamber fails to raise an point-of-order objection; (2) A majority in that chamber votes to overrrule a point-of-order objection; or (3) Congress repeals the point-of-order device before considering the bill. The last of these three possibilities would face difficult hurdles, even though the Constitution's Rules of Proceedings clause allows a single House to change its rules without having to enact a statute through the bicameralism and presentment processes. 159 In the Senate, the standing rules remain in effect from one Congress to the next, and any attempt to change a Senate rule is subject to a filibuster, where a supermajority is needed to invoke cloture and end debate. 160 And in the House, the standing rules may be changed only by a unanimous consent agreement, by a 2/3 supermajority vote to suspend the rules, 161 or by a simple majority voting to approve a proposal from the House Rules Committee, which has jurisdiction over the House rules. 162 The House Rules Committee can also propose a "special rule" to govern the House debate over a particular bill, and if the full House approves the special rule by majority vote, then the procedures in the special rule will govern the House's consideration of that specific legislation. And some "special rules" purport to waive all points of order against the pending legislation, which allows a simple majority of the House (along with a simple majority of the Rules Committee) to prevent legislators from raising a point of order mechanism against certain bills. 163 But Congress can foreclose this evasion by providing that special rules that waive points of order against bills pertaining to the military or intelligence agencies are themselves out of order; Congress included such a provision in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and can include a similar provision in establishing points of order in national-security legislation. 164 When a point-of-order lurks in the background, legislators have incentives to draft bills in a manner that will avoid a possible point-of-order objection that could slow or derail the legislation. In 1995, for example, Congress enacted the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 ("UMRA"), which established a point of order against legislation that imposed unfunded mandates on state or local governments in excess of $50 million a year (net of savings). 165 On several occasions in the 104th Congress, the sponsors of major reform legislation modified their proposals before they reached the floor in order to avoid a point-of-order objection under the UMRA. 166 Point-of-order mechanisms would also induce Congress to re-enact prohibitions on extended military hostilities and warrantless electronic surveillance in its annual appropriations legislation, and consistently confront the President with legislation that reiterates the prohibitions in the framework statutes. If the President vetoes the legislation, he will have to bargain with Congress to get specific authorization or a waiver of the point of order. And if the President signs the legislation, it becomes more difficult for his lawyers to concoct a legal rationale to escape Congress's codified clear-statement regime. They would be unable to argue that the restrictions unconstitutionally "bind" future legislatures. When the contemporaneous Congress imposes these restrictions in statutes that the President signs, they cannot be fobbed off as unconstitutional dead-hand influences from a bygone Congress. The point-of-order device will also prevent executive-branch lawyers from resorting to their broad theories of "implied repeal" when it induces Congress's future legislation to explicitly prohibit military hostilities beyond 60 days or warrantless electronic surveillance. Statutes that might enable executivebranch lawyers to claim to exploit the last-in-time rule and claim implicit congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous statutory language would be subject to a point of order in both the House and Senate. The executive-branch legal arguments in the Kosovo and NSA surveillance memos put the onus on Congress to specifically negate a Presidential prerogative in future legislation; the point-of-order mechanism provides an institutional answer to that challenge.
The second advantage of the point-of-order device is that it would improve the likelihood of Congress enforcing its codified clear-statement regime against a recalcitrant executive. When Congress annually reaffirms statutory prohibitions on certain endeavors, a President that acts without specific congressional authorization will defy a statutory prohibition that the contemporaneous Congress has enacted, rather than a restriction imposed by a Congress from another era. That should give legislators more impetus to retaliate with the weapons in their constitutional arsenal, as the President's actions more directly threaten their institutional prerogative to legislate constraints on executive action. The point-of-order also reduces the transactions costs of enforcing the clear-statement regime against the executive, because it empowers a single legislator to insist that bills pending in Congress explicitly prohibit activities that lack specific congressional authorization, 167 and the appropriations process ensures that this opportunity will arise at least once a year. Any legislator, for example, could have objected to the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act on the ground that it financed activities related to the Kosovo hostilities without specifically authorizing the conflict or reiterating the statutory prohibitions in the War Powers Resolution. Such an objection would force an up-or-down roll-call vote in Congress on the discrete issue of whether to adhere to section 8(a)(1)'s clear-statement regime, rather than forcing anti-war legislators to vote on a bill that bundles provisions that they oppose with many others that they support. 168 This will leave Congress unable to finance unilateral Presidential endeavors unless a majority in each House votes to override a point-of-order objection on that specific question, or unless every member in a chamber declines to raise a point of order to the appropriations legislation.
C
Point-of-order devices are commonplace in framework legislation that governs the federal budget process. For example, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 declares that "it shall not be in order" in the House or the Senate to consider certain legislation that imposes certain unfunded mandates on state and local governments. 169 The Senate's "Byrd Rule" allows individual Senators to raise points of order against certain provisions in budget reconciliation bills that increase the deficit in future fiscal years. 170 And the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation also employed point-of-order mechanisms to enforce budgetary precommitments. 171 Without the point-of-order mechanisms, future Congresses could easily escape these framework statutes' constraints by proposing and enacting legislation that exempts itself from these earlier-enacted restrictions. The pointof-order device empowers individual legislators to resist such efforts in future Congresses, and strengthens the precommitment in the framework statute. 172 But Congress has never included this type of mechanism to enforce its clearstatement requirements in national-security legislation. In these statutes, Congress codifies strongly worded clear-statement regimes that require Presidents to obtain specific congressional authorization for certain actions, but it fails to establish effective mechanisms to enforce them against future political actors. The clear-statement requirements become mere parchment barriers that executive-branch lawyers can evade with expansive theories of constitutional avoidance and implied repeal, while Congress acquiesces to Presidential actions that lack specific congressional authorization. Congress could enact stronger institutional enforcement mechanisms for its codified clear-statement regimes, but it does not do so, even as it continues to enact more narrow and explicit clear-statement requirements in its national-security legislation. 173 There are at least three possible explanations for the disparate precommitment strategies in Congress's budgetary and national-security legislation. First, lawmakers may anticipate stronger future political pressures to deviate from budgetary precommitments. For this reason, they may believe that effective framework legislation requires them to include a point-of-order mechanism. But with national-security legislation, legislators may think that that the point-of-order device is less necessary because they predict, at the time they enact the legislation, that there will be fewer temptations for future political actors to deviate from the codified clear-statement regime.
A second explanation may be that legislators want the national-security precommitments to be weaker than the precommitments in the federal budget laws. Some legislators might believe that the deficit-control precommitments are more important to enforce than the clear-statement regimes in Congress's national-security framework statutes. They might want the clear-statement regimes in the War Powers Resolution and FISA to serve as "outlaw-and-forgive" regimes, 174 which provide an advisory caution against executive-branch unilateralism but leave room for congressional acquiescence if the President decides to proceed without specific authorization. Or legislators might enact the clear-statement requirements as a political show to placate constituents who are outraged over executive-branch abuses, without any genuine concern for enforcing them against future political actors. 175 This approach preserves legislators' ability to hurl credible accusations of lawbreaking when the President acts without specific congressional authorization, while allowing other legislators to avoid casting a transparent vote on whether to authorize or stop the President's supposedly unauthorized endeavors. 176 Finally, the President's influence in the legislative process may account for the dearth of effective enforcement mechanisms in Congress's national-security legislation. The President can shape legislation not only with his veto power but also with his ability to influence legislators, especially those who belong to his political party. Any proposal to add meaningful enforcement mechanisms to the clear-statement requirements in Congress's national-security legislation would provoke resistance from the President and his allies in Congress. The President would be far less likely to oppose congressional efforts to establish point-of-order devices in the budgetary framework legislation. 177 The upshot is that Congress's national-security legislation has produced fainthearted clear-statement regimes, which establish strongly-worded clear-statement requirements in framework legislation but omit a mechanism to enforce them against future political actors. This may represent a détente or compromise between the political branches, or an intentional choice by members of Congress. But the mechanisms of enforcement (if any) determine whether a codified clear-statement requirement will prevent the executive branch from inferring congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous legislation. Merely narrowing a codified clear-statement requirement, or amplifying the commands in Congress's framework legislation, as recent enactments and proposals have done, will do little to counter the executive branch's aggressive interpretive theories of constitutional avoidance or implied repeal, or the willingness of future legislators or courts to acquiesce to Presidential initiative.
CONCLUSION
Congress will frequently legislate clear-statement requirements in its nationalsecurity legislation. But executive-branch lawyers have a well-rehearsed stock of legal arguments that they use to evade them. Their broad theories of constitutional avoidance and implied repeal are irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's interpretive doctrines, but they enable the President to assert that his actions are legally justified and may embolden executive-branch officials and employees who might otherwise fear criminal liability or political reprisals. As a result, Presidents of both political parties continue to infer congressional authorization from vague or ambiguous statutory language, even in the teeth of codified clear-statement requirements in Congress's framework legislation. And Congress has been unwilling to force the executive to comply with its codified clearstatement regimes.
Recently-enacted legislation has imposed more narrow and explicit clearstatement regimes regarding electronic surveillance outside of FISA and detainee treatment. And many have proposed legislation that withholds funds from extended military hostilities or electronic surveillance that Congress has not specifically authorized. But these statutes and proposals do nothing to counter the executive branch's expansive theories of constitutional avoidance and implied repeal. Presidents will still attempt to claim congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous statutory language, and brush aside the tighter clear-statement requirements on the ground that they "bind future Congresses," and that the ambiguous later-enacted statute "implicitly repeals" the codified clear-statement requirement. An effective clear-statement regime will need a mechanism that induces future Congress to specifically prohibit extended military hostilities, electronic surveillance outside of FISA, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, in any future legislation that might be construed to implicitly authorize it.
A point-of-order mechanism would help precommit future legislators against enacting vague or ambiguous legislation that the executive might use to claim implicit congressional "authorization" for such actions. And it would improve the likelihood that future legislators will confront a President that acts without specific congressional authorization by withholding funding for such endeavors. Yet Congress has never established such a device in its national-security legislation, even though it enacts pointof-order mechanisms to enforce precommitments in framework legislation governing the federal budget process. Whatever the reasons for Congress's unwillingness to establish a point-of-order enforcement mechanism for its codified clear-statement regimes in national-security law, no one should think that simply codifying more narrow or explicit clear-statement requirements will stop Presidents from continuing to infer congressional authorization from vague or ambiguous statutory language.
